
William Dalrymple recounts the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), tracing the British Empire's decision to invade Afghanistan to replace Emir Dost Mohammad Khan with the puppet ruler Shah Shuja. Using newly discovered Afghan archival sources alongside British records, Dalrymple chronicles the catastrophic retreat from Kabul and the subsequent destruction of the Army of the Indus. He details how colonial arrogance and a fundamental misunderstanding of tribal politics led to one of the greatest military disasters of the nineteenth century, establishing a cycle of foreign intervention and insurgent resistance.
This history serves readers interested in the mechanics of failed occupations and Central Asian geopolitics. Those who study the Great Game find a detailed breakdown of how intelligence failures and cultural blind spots trigger long-term instability. The reader gains a clear perspective on the similarities between Victorian-era imperial overreach and modern military involvement in the region. By the end, one understands the specific tribal dynamics and topographical challenges that have historically frustrated external attempts to govern the Afghan state.
- Published
- 2013
- Language
- EN
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